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When do politicians in developing democracies prioritize meritocratic recruitment over pa-
tronage hiring for public sector jobs? I distinguish between menial and professional positions
and argue that the former are valuable for sustaining party machines, while manipulating the
latter can undermine state performance. Accordingly, politicians will interfere to ensure their
co-partisans are hired to menial positions but select professional bureaucrats based on merito-
cratic criteria. I test my argument using novel bureaucrat-level data from Ghana (n = 17,942)
and leverage a change in the governing party to investigate hiring patterns. The results sug-
gest that partisan bias is confined to menial jobs. The findings shed light on the mixed effects
of electoral competition on patronage identified in prior studies: competition may dissuade
politicians from interfering in recruitment to high-ranked positions, but encourage them to
hire partisans for low-ranked positions.
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Supplementary material for this article is available in the appendix in the online edi-
tion. Replication files are available in the JOP Data Archive on Dataverse http:
//thedata.harvard.edu/dvn/dv/jop.
Whether civil servants are hired based on merit or political criteria has broad implications
for state capacity and the overall health of democracy (O’Dwyer, 2006; Grzymala-Busse, 2007;
Geddes, 1994). Patronage recruits are likely to be less competent and also not essential to the
running of the state. This type of hiring can place an unnecessary strain on the public purse, and
undermine investment in other vital areas, such as capital infrastructure. It can also perpetuate a
broader clientelistic political economy. Once hired, co-partisan bureaucrats can help politicians
allocate scarce public resources in sub-optimal ways.1 Partisan appointees may also worsen the
provision of public services (Colonnelli, Prem and Teso, 2017) and increase levels of corruption
(Oliveros and Schuster, 2018).
Given these high stakes, it is important to understand when politicians in developing
democracies are more likely to rely on meritocratic versus partisan recruitment. Prior research
has not been able to adequately address this question because, by using changes in legislation to
signal the onset of meritocracy (Geddes, 1994), it treats the concept of meritocracy as dichotomous.
Other research similarly assumes the question away by portraying post-colonial states as neopat-
rimonial, a situation in which all public sector jobs are often assumed to be distributed politically
(Bayart, 1993; Chabal and Daloz, 1999; Van de Walle, 2001).
Despite this dominant narrative, in practice most countries lie on a continuum between
complete meritocracy and wholesale partisan interference (Grindle, 2012). I build on this insight
and consider when the benefits of patronage hiring are outweighed by the costs. I theorize that
the costs of non-competitive recruitment vary across public sector positions, and therefore that
politicians may support meritocratic recruitment for some posts and actively interfere in hiring for
others. Meddling in hiring for professional positions, such as budget analysts, engineers, and plan-
ning officers, is costly to politicians. It can hurt incumbents electorally because it can impact state
performance. In contrast, interference in low-ranking public sector jobs, such as sanitation officers,
laborers, and security guards, poses a lower risk to state performance. Furthermore, politicians can
award low-ranked positions to party brokers in order to sustain party machines. In many develop-
1See Golden and Min (2013) for a review of the literature on distributive politics and partisan bias in the allocation
of public resources.
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ing countries party brokers lack the necessary educational background to succeed in high-ranked
positions. In short, incumbent politicians in developing democracies can pursue a dual strategy of
hiring professional bureaucrats based on meritocratic criteria and menial bureaucrats according to
partisan criteria.
To test my argument, I assembly unique data on the universe of over 40,000 bureaucrats
working in 200 local governments in Ghana, a stable democracy in West Africa. Such fine-grained
data from a developing country are often not available or are very hard to obtain, which is why only
a handful of studies has been able to use similar micro-level data.2 Electoral politics in Ghana are
dominated by the National Democratic Congress (NDC) and the New Patriotic Party (NPP). Since
the restoration of democracy, the country’s national elections have become increasingly competi-
tive. The NDC won the 2008 presidential election – the focus of this article – by less than half a
percent.3 In the analysis, I exploit this change in the ruling party to investigate hiring patterns.
The data on bureaucrats include information on the hiring date of each employee. I use the
first term (2005–2008) as a baseline for comparison with hiring patterns in the second term (2009–
2012). My study sample consists of all bureaucrats hired during these two terms (n = 17,942). If
the conventional wisdom of blanket patronage hiring is correct, we would expect the new ruling
party to favor its co-partisans for all positions, at the expense of opponents. The data include
information on bureaucrats’ individual characteristics. In the analysis, I use bureaucrats’ ethnicity
and home region to proxy for their party.4
Disaggregating the data between professional and menial positions, I find no evidence of
partisan hiring for professional positions. Professional recruits also become better qualified over
time, which suggests a preference for competence. Conversely, a change in ruling party is asso-
ciated with a 10-percentage-point increase in the probability that a co-partisan will be hired to a
menial post. This increase is equivalent to about 635 extra public sector jobs being awarded to
2The empirical study of bureaucratic recruitment in developing countries is a burgeoning field in political science
and economics. Relevant papers include: Hassan (2016); Sigman (2015); Colonnelli, Prem and Teso (2017); Iyer and
Mani (2012); Pierskalla and Sacks (2019); Xu (Forthcoming).
3The NDC won with 50.2 percent of votes, compared to 49.8 percent for NPP.
4In Section 3.2, I discuss how I infer partisanship from these two variables.
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government co-partisans, at the cost of over 3 million USD over a four-year term.5 Because the
data only contain information on local bureaucrats, this bias likely represents a fraction of the ag-
gregate number of partisan hires during the study period. While the analysis does not confirm that
such bias led to the appointment of bureaucrats who were not qualified to take menial posts, it does
suggest that bureaucrats’ identity influenced who the new governing party hired.
My theory suggests that politicians reward party brokers for their support by securing me-
nial jobs for them. I combine quantitative and qualitative data to substantiate this claim. The
qualitative evidence suggests that grassroots brokers in Ghana are motivated to work for parties
in return for material benefits, including public sector jobs. The data also provide evidence of
strategic hiring: politicians allocate more new jobs to districts where brokers attract new voters.
This article makes three contributions. First, the results contribute to the literature on public
sector development. It is one of the first empirical studies in political science to use administrative
data to document trends in public sector hiring practices in developing countries (see also Hassan,
2016; Pierskalla and Sacks, 2019). My theoretical approach also sheds light on what appear to
be inconsistent findings regarding the effect of electoral competition on patronage hiring. While
many scholars assert that competition can promote meritocracy (Geddes, 1994; Ting et al., 2013),
others find that competition can encourage clientelism, and swell the ranks of the public sector
(Pierskalla and Sacks, 2019; Driscoll, 2017; Lindberg, 2003). My theory suggests that electoral
competition may have both of these effects: it may dissuade politicians from interfering in hiring
for high-ranked positions, while encouraging them to recruit partisans to low-ranked positions.
Second, I advance the literature on measuring meritocracy. Past studies have primarily used
either legislation (Geddes, 1994) or surveys of experts or bureaucrats (Kopeckỳ, 2011; Sigman,
2015) to measure this concept. My approach – which combines bureaucrat-level data with a change
in the ruling party – is more objective than survey-based methods. Further, the data allow us to
analyze de facto practices rather than de jure protocols.
5The total number of menial hires between 2009 and 2012 was 6,359. See Table C.1. To calculate the cost of 635
bureaucrats, I assume a (conservatively low) monthly salary of 100 USD.
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Third, I contribute to the burgeoning empirical literature on party brokers (Calvo and
Murillo, 2013; Stokes et al., 2013; Larreguy, Marshall and Querubin, 2016). My work comple-
ments prior studies that show brokers often hold public sector positions (Oliveros, 2016), and
advances this literature by considering the types of jobs that brokers are likely to hold.
1 A theory of dual hiring: combining merit and patronage
Governments in low-income countries dedicate about a third of public budgets to bureaucrats’
salaries.6 In African countries, the wage bill is often the government’s single biggest expense: it
represents 55 percent of public expenditure in Kenya, 45 percent in Ghana, and over 33 percent
in South Africa.7 While the seminal literature on the African state suggests that governments dis-
tribute most public sector jobs on the basis of political criteria (Bayart, 1993; Chabal and Daloz,
1999), these claims have not been tested empirically since the re-introduction of multi-party elec-
tions in the early 1990s. In this article, I develop a theory of when politicians in developing
democracies prioritize meritocratic recruitment over patronage hiring for public sector jobs.
1.1 The benefits to politicians of distributing low-ranked public sector positions to partisans
I propose that the costs and benefits of patronage hiring to politicians in developing democracies
vary according to the type of public sector job. Certain types of jobs are especially valuable to
politicians. In particular, politicians who operate in clientelistic polities will value public sector
jobs that they can award to grassroots party brokers. Awarding jobs to brokers has a multiplier
effect on votes: the politician gains the support of the broker and her clients. US party leaders used
jobs in the postal service and customs houses to build and sustain party machines during the 19th
century (Carpenter, 2001). For example in Chicago, political parties distributed jobs to precinct
captains who worked to get out the vote and dispense private goods to citizens (Wilson, 1961).8
6See Appendix Table A.1.
7On Kenya, see Aljazeera (2014), on Ghana see Africa Confidential (2018), and on South Africa see BusinessTech
(2018).
8In the US, another major benefit of patronage hiring was the contributions (or assessments) that office holders
gave to the party, which constituted 2–10 percent of their salaries (Johnson and Libecap, 1994, 15).
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Historical accounts of the US transition towards meritocracy suggest that it took decades
for low-ranking jobs outside the capital to be taken out of the hands of politicians. Patronage was
sustained for most field positions and top administrative jobs in the capital (Skowronek, 1982, 69).
Post offices employing over 50 persons were subject to the Pendleton Act of 1883. However, in
1896 there were still 76,000 fourth-class postmaster positions that were not covered by the act, and
were therefore available for parties to distribute to loyalists (Skowronek, 1982, 72). In contrast,
clerical jobs based in the capital were easy for politicians to give up.
The practice of awarding public sector jobs to those who can mobilize voters on behalf of
the incumbent party has been documented in other contexts. O’Dwyer (2006) argues that in new
Eastern European democracies, citizens were demobilized after years of communist rule such that
mass parties with fee-paying memberships are not possible. He maintains that incumbent politi-
cians instead give public sector jobs to party activists (529). Callen, Gulzar and Rezaee (2018)
argue that politicians in Pakistan provide patronage to doctors because they act as important politi-
cal mediators in rural areas at election time. An original survey of party brokers in Argentina shows
that 30 percent of brokers have public sector jobs (Stokes et al., 2013, 99). In Africa, scholars argue
that politicians create new local-level units precisely so they can distribute new administrative and
political positions to local brokers (Hassan and Sheely, 2017) and party supporters (Green, 2010).9
While party brokers have significant leadership skills and valuable ties to local elites, in
developing countries they are often not particularly well educated. Indeed, many intermediaries
work for parties for the material benefits they can extract to supplement their incomes (Bob-Milliar,
2012). A survey of grassroots party brokers in Ghana shows that they are “characteristically very
youthful but poorly educated or without formal education" (Bob-Milliar, 2012, 670). Thus politi-
cians can usually only reward them with low-ranked positions.10 Because middle-class citizens
9Similarly, Gottlieb et al. (2018) argue that incumbent parties create new administrative units to co-opt strong
community brokers in areas where the party is not already strong. While they do not suggest that local government
jobs are distributed directly to brokers, they imply that the incumbent party uses local government units to mobilize
votes via community-level brokers.
10The jobs that party brokers can reasonably perform will vary according to the country’s level of development. In
richer countries, where the average level of education will be higher than in poorer countries, brokers may be educated
enough to hold mid-ranked positions in the bureaucracy.
5
with university degrees have fewer financial incentives to work for parties, they are less likely to
become brokers. In summary, politicians in developing democracies who want to sustain party ma-
chines will seek to exercise control over hiring for low-ranking (menial) jobs in the public sector,
which they can use to reward grassroots party brokers.
1.2 The costs to politicians of distributing high-ranked public sector positions to partisans
While the benefits of patronage appointments include the ability to extract loyalty and campaign
work from public officials, patronage hiring also has at least two important costs. First, it can
lead to the inefficient functioning of the state. Second, as the size of the public sector grows,
interfering in recruitment processes becomes increasingly time intensive for politicians. These
costs to politicians are likely to be greater for high-ranked jobs than for low-ranked jobs, which
can incentivize politicians to recruit professional bureaucrats on the basis of meritocratic criteria.11
In developing democracies, politicians often retain discretionary control over bureaucrats’ careers,
which they can leverage to influence their work. Such discretion allows politicians to get the best
of both worlds: high levels of competence and loyalty.
As regards state performance, recruiting professional bureaucrats on the basis of partisan,
as opposed to meritocratic, criteria can lead to hiring less competent bureaucrats. Partisan recruits
are likely to underperform their duties and to be more corrupt (Oliveros and Schuster, 2018).
Indeed, meritocratic recruitment has been identified as the most important factor in improving
bureaucratic performance (Rauch and Evans, 2000). Bureaucratic underperformance can lead to
macro-economic instability and the inefficient delivery of public services. Politicians are likely to
be concerned with poor state performance if voters consider government performance when voting.
Evidence suggests that even in relatively clientelistic polities, some voters consider eco-
nomic management and public service delivery when they vote. The incumbent party’s ability
to deliver on macro-economic policies has been shown to be an important determinant of vote
11Throughout, I dichotomize jobs into “low ranked" vs. “high ranked." My argument does not apply to top positions
in the public sector such as heads of executive agencies and ambassadors, which remain patronage appointments in
most countries (Fisman and Golden, 2017, 39) Unlike other public sector positions, these top-tier jobs are usually not
subject to tenure.
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choice across the developing world, in Africa (Bratton, Bhavnani and Chen, 2012), Latin America
(Roberts and Wibbels, 1999; Lewis-Beck and Ratto, 2013), and Eastern Europe (Roberts, 2008).
Performance voting has also been demonstrated in individual African countries such as Zambia
(Posner and Simon, 2002), Ghana (Youde, 2005; Lindberg and Morrison, 2008; Hoffman and
Long, 2013) and South Africa (Mattes and Piombo, 2001; Ferree, 2006).12 Regarding develop-
ment outcomes, voters prefer politicians who deliver local public infrastructure such as roads,
schools, and health clinics (Harding, 2015; Weghorst and Lindberg, 2013; Carlson, 2015; Ofosu,
2018).
Electoral pressures on politicians to deliver development, combined with the difficulty of
instituting wholesale meritocratic recruitment practices, can lead politicians to establish bureau-
cratic “pockets of efficiency" (Geddes, 1994). These national-level agencies operate outside the
federal bureaucracy and recruit personnel on the basis of merit (Geddes, 1994, 61). Applying this
argument to the local level – the empirical focus of this article – politicians may also have an in-
centive to recruit competent bureaucrats to work in local governments to efficiently deliver local
public goods and services to voters. Given the smaller size of the workforce in local governments,
the marginal value of a highly trained bureaucrat is higher in local government offices compared
to the national bureaucracy.
Politicians’ concerns about the potential electoral reward (or punishment) of better state
performance are likely to be intensified in competitive – or increasingly competitive – democratic
environments. The positive relationship between electoral competition and the adoption of mer-
itocratic reforms has been demonstrated both theoretically (Geddes, 1991; Ting et al., 2013) and
empirically (Geddes, 1994; Grindle, 2012; Ting et al., 2013; Grzymala-Busse, 2007).13 Geddes
12For example, Posner and Simon (2002) find that “regardless of background, respondents who expressed dissat-
isfaction with the economy were 10–15 percentage points less likely to vote for [President] Chiluba than their more
satisfied counterparts" (319). Hoffman and Long (2013) conclude in Ghana that “demographic and ethnic factors
are far less important than respondents’ beliefs about the parties, candidates, the NPP’s performance, and economic
conditions" (139).
13In contrast to this literature, one can reasonably argue that electoral competition can lead incumbents to prefer an
inefficient bureaucracy to an efficient one because, should the incumbents lose office, their opponent can use a highly
efficient bureaucracy against them in the future. However, incumbents must weigh this potential should they lose, to
the incentive they have to take steps to remain in office. In situations where the likelihood of remaining in office is
strengthened by performing well, politicians are likely to prioritize strengthening the state.
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(1991) argues that when two political parties are roughly equally popular, it becomes advantageous
for the incumbent to adopt reforms in order to capture the electoral benefits of adopting meritoc-
racy. Grzymala-Busse (2007) argues that robust competition leads to monitoring by opponents. As
a result, governing parties avoid exploitative state practices to preemptively protect against oppo-
sition criticism. In short, electoral incentives can encourage merit-based hiring due to the resulting
gains (or losses) in incumbent vote share.
A second cost to politicians of interfering in high-ranked bureaucratic positions is the time
it takes to distribute and monitor these appointments. Urbanization and industrialization lead to an
increase in the size of the public sector, and bureaucratic tasks become increasingly complex. As
the public sector gets larger it becomes more costly for politicians to manage recruitment processes.
As the number of positions increases, politicians are required to spend more time ensuring that
these positions are filled by loyalists. At some point, the time politicians spend interfering in
hiring processes outweighs the benefits. Scholars of the US have argued that the growth in the
size of the federal labor force was “[the] overriding factor that changed the way in which federal
politicians viewed patronage" (Johnson and Libecap, 1994, 13).
The costs of patronage hiring on politicians’ time are likely to be greater for professional
positions than for menial jobs. This is because politicians can delegate the recruitment of menial
personnel to local party machines, which can identify grassroots brokers who are suitable for these
roles. It may be harder for local machines to identify relevant people for professional positions.
Instead, politicians can delegate the recruitment of professional bureaucrats to other bureaucrats,
who will then organize competitive examinations, develop interview procedures, and establish
minimum qualification standards for each job. After bureaucrats have developed rules for meri-
tocratic hiring it becomes more difficult for politicians to intervene. Such interventions are likely
to be visible, which can generate criticism from other civil servants, political opponents or from
non-governmental organizations, and result in negative media coverage.
Finally, there is an overlooked reason why politicians may have an incentive to prioritize
professional competence over partisan loyalty: politicians often continue to be able to influence the
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work of professional bureaucrats even when they do not hire their co-partisans. Empirical research
from India and Ghana suggests that politicians may be willing to allow competitive recruitment for
professional positions because they know they can still interfere in bureaucrats’ careers to influence
their behavior (Iyer and Mani, 2012; Brierley, 2018). Despite the existence of highly competitive
examinations to enter the top ranks of the civil service in India, for example, politicians continue
to influence the actions of civil servants through their control over geographic transfers (Iyer and
Mani, 2012; Wade, 1982). Politicians can use transfers, or the threat of transfers, to influence
outcomes such as where new local public goods are placed. This suggests that politicians can
recruit highly educated professional bureaucrats without stymieing their attempts to politicize the
distribution of state resources.
In summary, performance voting incentivizes politicians to develop a preference for hir-
ing competent professionals. This preference will intensify as electoral competition increases be-
cause small electoral gains or losses become politically consequential.14 Pressure on politicians
to delegate bureaucratic recruitment to other bureaucrats will also occur as states become larger
and more complex. Because politicians can delegate the recruitment of low-ranked bureaucrats to
party machines, pressures on politicians will be more significant for high-ranked positions. Finally,
politicians are likely to feel more comfortable delegating recruitment to professional positions to
other bureaucrats because they have additional tools – besides hiring – that they can leverage to
control the work of bureaucrats once appointed. This paper tests the hypothesis that politicians in
clientelistic democracies are more likely to hire public employees on the basis of partisan loyalty
for menial jobs rather than for professional positions.
14It could be argued that improving state performance will raise the expectations of voters, who may then seek to
hold incumbents accountable to a greater extent in future electoral rounds. However, in competitive electoral envi-
ronments where voters have viable alternative options, politicians will have a limited ability to suppress development
outcomes because voters will turn to the opposition. Other scholars have highlighted the existence of a robust opposi-
tion as an important factor driving politicians’ incentives to enhance state capacity (O’Dwyer, 2006; Grzymala-Busse,
2007).
9
2 Ghana’s electoral environment and scope conditions of the argument
I evaluate my argument using a novel dataset of bureaucrats who work in local governments in
Ghana. Ghana’s electoral system has supported three peaceful transitions of executive power (in
2000, 2008, and 2016). Two political parties dominate the electoral landscape, the NPP and NDC.
National elections are competitive, and have become increasingly so since democracy was re-
instituted in 1992. I focus on the 2008 election, which the NDC won by a margin of less than 0.5
percent of the votes. This election followed two prior elections that saw a significant decrease in
the margin of victory of the presidential victor: while in the 2000 election the NPP presidential
candidate won by a margin of 14 percent, this dropped to 8 percent in 2004.15
My argument of a dual hiring strategy has two central scope conditions. First, politicians
must have a preference to govern a state that functions at least reasonably well. This preference
encourages them to recruit professional bureaucrats based on non-partisan criteria. This preference
is likely to be intensified in competitive electoral environments because the electoral rewards (or
punishment) for delivering (not delivering) economic stability or development have greater conse-
quences; incumbents may be ousted.16 Second, politicians must mobilize electoral support through
grassroots brokers. This condition is likely to hold in developing democracies where parties rely
on direct personal contact to rally voters. As organizationally strong political parties are likely
to rely more on partisan as opposed to community brokers (Baldwin, 2013; Gottlieb, 2017), the
pressure to reward partisan brokers with public sector jobs is expected to be higher in countries
with organizationally strong political parties.
Ghana is a case in which there is evidence of performative voting and high levels of elec-
toral competition. Further, both are the two major political parties are organizationally strong and
rely on partisan brokers to mobilize support (Ichino and Nathan, 2013; Bob-Milliar, 2012). As
regards performance voting, many scholars have argued that in Ghana, “popular evaluations of
government performance trump the pervasive tugs of language and tribe" (Bratton, Bhavnani and
15The NDC won the 2012 election by a margin of 3 percent.
16High levels of electoral competition may be present in countries with both stable and more fluid party systems.
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Chen, 2012, 30). For example, Lindberg and Morrison (2008) conduct an open-ended survey and
differentiate between evaluative and non-evaluative motivations for vote choice and conclude that
“evaluative voting behavior is by far the most common stance in Ghana." Similarly, Jeffries (1998)
argues that “The basis for the NDC’s victory [in 1996] was laid by its economic and developmental
policies," most importantly the Rawlings’ government’s provision of development projects (205).
The influential role of economic performance on voters’ attitudes and eventual vote choice has
also been demonstrated through quantitative analyses of both the 2000 and 2008 elections (Youde,
2005; Hoffman and Long, 2013).
Political power in Ghana is decentralized to 216 local governments: one local government
per district.17 Local governments are responsible for the development of districts, including the
provision of basic infrastructure and public works and services. The president appoints a District
Chief Executive (akin to a mayor) to head each local government, in consultation with the local
branch of the ruling party. Thus all mayors are members of the ruling party, regardless of the
partisanship of the majority of voters in the district. Each local government has a political and a
bureaucratic arm. This articles focuses on the bureaucratic arm. Once appointed, local bureaucrats
– in both professional and menial positions – have security of tenure.
3 Dataset of local bureaucrats and measurement
The dataset includes employee-level information of civil servants working in 199 of Ghana’s 216
local governments18 who were in active employment in 2015.19 Over 40,000 bureaucrats are
included in the data. I restrict the analysis to bureaucrats hired between 2005 and 2012, which
leaves a total of 17,942 recruits. The mean number of workers per district is 191. In theory, all
local government employees should be included. While the data are as comprehensive as possible,
17Local governments are known as District, Municipal or Metropolitan Assemblies, with classifications based on
the population of the district.
18There is one local government in each district.
19These data were compiled by Ghana’s Ministry of Local Government and Rural and the Local Government Service
Secretariat in partnership with consultants hired by the European Union.
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some gaps remain.20 To analyze hiring patterns, I use information of the date that each bureaucrat
was hired to work in the local bureaucrat. This date reflects the first recruitment date of each
bureaucrat.
All candidates for local government jobs are recruited through a centralized hiring pro-
cess21 that requires candidates to submit a generic application form to the Local Government Sec-
retariat offices in the capital city, Accra. Candidates can submit these applications at any time,
but many applicants apply following mass-hiring advertisements that the government places in na-
tional newspapers. Interviews with staff at the Local Government Secretariat suggest that mass
hiring is the modal type of hiring, as opposed to hiring for individual positions as they become
available.
Candidates applying for positions that I code as professional (planning officers, budget of-
ficers, engineers, accountants, and economists) are typically recruited using interviews and exams.
Candidates recruited to menial positions (sanitation officers, laborers, security guards and drivers)
do not sit formal exams. Anecdotal evidence suggests that these candidates are employed through
interviews, as well as upon recommendation from local governments to the national secretariat.
Recommendations from local governments are prone to partisan influence because mayors are
political appointees, and, thus, co-partisan with the national government. In addition to direct rec-
ommendations, which likely reveal a candidates partisanship, during the hiring process, politicians
and bureaucrats who engage in recruitment can use informational cues – names and home town
and region – to infer the likely partisanship of each potential new hire.
3.1 Measuring levels of meritocracy with administrative data
I use the bureaucrat data combined with a change in the governing party to assess patronage versus
meritocratic hiring. If hiring were purely meritocratic, changes in the governing party should not
influence the types of bureaucrats who are hired. Conversely, swings in who gets hired as power
20One omission is that the top bureaucrat in a district (the district co-ordinating director) is often excluded.
21While local governments can recruit temporary workers and pay them using their own internally generated rev-
enues, they are not able to recruit permanent employees.
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changes hands would indicate non-merit-based hiring. An additional advantage of using adminis-
trative data is that it also permits the disaggregation of civil servants across different departments
and different types of positions to investigate which types of jobs or departments are isolated from
interference. This approach thus allows me to assess my theory. One challenge of using adminis-
trative data is the need to first code the inferred partisanship of each bureaucratic recruit.
3.2 Coding civil servants’ partisanship
The ideal dataset with which to assess the theory would include the partisanship of each bureaucrat
at the time of hiring. However, the act of collecting such data would implicate the government in
discriminatory practices, and is therefore unavailable. Instead of relying on a partisanship variable,
I use the available data to create two proxies of partisanship. First, I code partisanship using
the ethnic group of each bureaucrat. Second, I use their home region.22 The former approach
complements recent empirical work on bureaucrats in Africa that also uses individuals’ ethnic
group to determine partisanship (Hassan, 2016). The results that follow are robust to using either
measure.23 In the main analysis, I focus on the results based on individual ethnicity as this is
potentially a more precise categorization of individual partisanship.24
As ethnicity was not a variable in the bureaucrat-level data, I coded ethnicity based on
the first and last names of each worker. Names were first split into name fragments, which were
then coded into one of seven ethnic groupings by multiple research assistants in Ghana.25 After
matching names to ethnic groupings, I use Afrobarometer survey data to link ethnic groups to
22Home regions refer to where bureaucrats say they “come from", typically these regions are where individuals have
familial roots.
23I replicate the results using home region in the Appendix.
24For example, the NPP is dominant in the Ashanti region, which is the most populous region the country. While 75
percent of the population in the Ashanti region are Akans (who are aligned with the NPP), 25 percent belong to other
ethnic groups. As this example shows, using home region potentially misclassifies individuals.
25The ethnic groupings are as follows: Akan (Non-Fante), Akan, Fante, Ewe, Ga-Dangme, Guan and Northern. The
dictionary that I create builds on one made by Noah Nathan.
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political parties.26 Based on these data I code bureaucrats who are Akans as pro-NPP.27 I code
both Ewe and Northern ethnic groups as being aligned with the NDC.28
As regards the second proxy, I identify party strongholds as home regions where the ma-
jority of citizens voted for the same party across both elections I analyze.29 I code pro-NDC bu-
reaucrats as those whose home region is Northern, Volta, Upper West or Upper East, and pro-NPP
bureaucrats as those from either the Ashanti or Eastern regions.
4 Empirical strategy
To assess evidence of partisan bias in public sector hiring, I use the change in Ghana’s ruling
party following the December 2008 elections. The NDC’s John Evans Atta-Mills won the 2008
presidential election, and his party won a majority of seats in the parliament. Ghana’s alternation
in 2008 can be used as a cut point around which to investigate potential changes in bureaucratic
hiring. If bureaucrats are recruited on the basis of their partisan ties, we would expect to see
significant changes in the partisanship of bureaucrats who were hired after the new party came to
power. Specifically, if this is the case, we should expect to find a drop in the share of pro-NPP
bureaucrats hired after 2008, and a corresponding increase in the share of pro-NDC bureaucrats
hired. My main hypothesis predicts that any increase in pro-NDC hires would be confined to
menial positions.
26Specifically, I use data from rounds 3–6. I do not use data from rounds 1 and 2 because they did not ask which
party the respondent would vote for if the election were held tomorrow. I drop respondents who did not answer this
question, including those who refused to answer or answered “Don’t know”.
27See Appendix Table E.1.
28Ethnicity does not perfectly align with partisanship; not all Akans (Ewes/Northerners) support the NPP (NDC).
There could be concern that measurement error biases in favor of finding evidence of patronage hiring in instances in
which some Ewe and Northern bureaucrats who are coded as being Pro-NDC are in fact supporters of the opposition.
However, there is just as likely to be measurement error in the other direction: some of the Akans hired by the NDC
that are coded as NPP supporters will in fact be NDC supporters, leading me to under-estimate patronage hiring. Ex
ante, there is no reason to expect that bias in one direction will be more substantial than in the other.
29Appendix Table E.2 displays the election results disaggregated by region. The NDC captured the majority of
votes in the Volta, Northern, Upper West and Upper East regions, while the NPP received the majority of the votes in
the Ashanti and Eastern regions.
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To investigate the relationship between bureaucrats’ partisanship and the ruling party, I run
the following logistic regression model:
logit(pi) = β0 +β1Period 2i +β2Meniali +β3Period 2∗Meniali +β4Xi + εi.
Pi is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when the bureaucrat is aligned with the NDC
(NPP). Period 2 identifies the second hiring period after the change in the ruling party following
the 2008 election. Menial is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 when the position is low
ranking and 0 otherwise. I code positions using information on the job title of each bureaucrat. All
positions are classified as either professional or menial.
A summary list of positions and how they are coded is presented in Appendix Table B.1.
The process of classifying the positions is subjective. My aim was to code menial positions as
those that it would be uncontroversial to describe as such.30 Appendix Tables B.2, B.3, B.4 and
B.5 show the job titles, frequencies, and coding for all positions. The data also contain information
on the gender, age, and highest educational level of each bureaucrat. Thus, Xi is a matrix that
contains these control variables.
4.1 Additional information on civil servant database
While the bureaucrat-level data that I analyze are unusually rich, one drawback is that they were
collected at a single point in time (in June 2015). Therefore, I do not have information about
bureaucrats who were hired and vacated their positions before the data were collected.31 One
concern is that pro-NPP bureaucrats hired by the NPP government resigned when the NDC came
to power in 2008. The effect of this attrition would be to diminish the likelihood that I would
find evidence of partisan hiring under NDC rule. This is because pro-NPP bureaucrats, some of
30In Appendix Section L, I re-run the analysis varying the classifications of a number of positions where the classi-
fication may be considered controversial. The results are robust to these re-classifications. I also conduct the analysis
dropping one position at a time to check that the results are not driven by recruitment to a single position; again the
results remain robust.
31This is the first database of employees working in local governments in Ghana, which makes it impossible to
consult older databases.
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whom drop out of the data, would appear to compose a smaller share of those hired by the NPP.
Correspondingly, pro-NDC bureaucrats would appear to compose a larger share of those hired in
the first period.
There are three reasons why this type of attrition might be unlikely. First, civil service jobs
are valuable to workers because they offer financial stability in the form of a monthly paycheck,
benefits, and an assured pension. Civil servants can also ask politicians for help when they face
emergencies. Therefore it is unlikely that an employee would give up their job just because they
did not support the new ruling party. Second, while bureaucrats may be unhappy with the change
in government, they are likely to anticipate that their preferred party will not be out of office for
too long. Indeed, Ghana has seen alternations of power between the two major parties every eight
years since its return to democracy in 1992. Third, if it were the case that bureaucrats resigned en
masse following the 2008 elections, the data should show a spike in hiring in 2009 (or 2010) to
make up for the deficit of workers. Appendix Figure D.1 plots the total number of hires per year
between 2005 and 2012 and shows that there were fewer hires in 2009 and 2010 than in 2008.




To assess my argument, I first present descriptive data that display the characteristics of bureaucrats
hired across the two electoral periods. Second, I conduct a series of logistical regressions that
control for a number of important potential confounding variables that may influence hiring.
Table 1 shows the share of NDC and NPP bureaucrats hired in both periods, and presents the
results of a difference-in-means test. Bureaucrats’ partisanship is coded based on their ethnicity.32
The results show a positive and statistically significant increase in the share of NDC bureaucrats
32Appendix Table H.1 displays the same test with bureaucrats coded by home region. The main result of partisan
bias for menial positions is consistent in both tables.
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hired to menial positions in the second period (4.57 percentage points, p = 0.000). The results
also display a statistically significant reduction in the share of NPP bureaucrats hired for menial
positions (-4.80 percentage points). The change in the governing party is not associated with any
changes in the share of NDC or NPP bureaucrats hired to professional positions (shown by the
insignificant p-values). Overall, the aggregate data lend initial support to the main hypothesis –
that the NDC government favored its co-partisans when selecting candidates for menial positions.
In addition, the new government appears to disfavor NPP bureaucrats for menial positions.
Table 1: Difference-in-means test (ethnic group coding)
Period 1 Period 2 Difference P-value
(% of hires) (% of hires)
NDC bureaucrat Menial 35.25 39.81 4.56 0.000
Professional 33.69 32.29 -1.4 0.164
NPP bureaucrat Menial 44.55 39.72 -4.83 0.000
Professional 48.68 48.25 -0.43 0.687
In Figure 1, I categorize bureaucrats into three types: pro-NDC, pro-NPP, and swing. The
swing category indicates bureaucrats who do not belong to a politically-aligned ethnic group.33
Each plot displays the share of hires in each category per year. The left plot displays trends for
professional positions, while the right plot displays trends for menial positions. The dotted lines
indicate the change in the ruling party in December 2008.
The plot on the left provides evidence that the partisanship of bureaucrats recruited to
professional positions is fairly static across the two electoral periods. Under both governments,
the largest share of new hires was from the main ethnic group aligned with the NPP – the Akans.
This makes sense because the Akans are the largest single ethnic group in the country. Consistent
with Table 1, the change in governing party does not appear to alter hiring patterns for professional
jobs.
The right-hand plot in Figure 1 presents the trend for menial positions. In contrast to
professional jobs, there was a steady increase in the share of NDC bureaucrats hired for menial
33The unaligned ethnic groups are Fanti, Ga-Dangme and Guan.
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positions after the NDC government was elected at the end of 2008. The size of the increase was
10 percentage points over the period, from 36.5 percent at the start of their term to 46.5 percent
by the end of the term. The data also suggest that much of this increase took place at the direct
expense of NPP candidates, who experienced a corresponding decline in hires.34 When the NPP
were in office they also appear to have increasingly hired Pro-NPP and swing bureaucrats to menial
positions in the run up to the December 2008 election. This was potentially a strategy to secure
their victory or a result of the expectation that they may soon be out of office. In short, the yearly
trends complement the aggregate results in Table 1 and suggest partisan hiring for menial positions.































Notes: In Figure 1 employees are categorized as pro-NDC, pro-NPP or Swing. Each plot displays the share
of new hires from each group. Bureaucrats are coded according to their ethnic group. The left plot displays
trends for professional positions, and the right plot displays trends for menial positions. The dotted line
corresponds to the election of the NDC in December 2008.
34Appendix Figure I.1 displays the same plot with bureaucrats coded according to their home region. The results
remain the same, with a sharp increase in bureaucrats with traits that aligned them with the NDC supporters hired after
the change in governing party.
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5.1.1 Evidence of meritocratic hiring for professional positions
The relatively static pattern of hiring among different types of bureaucrats for professional posi-
tions across various governing parties suggests that non-partisan criteria drive recruitment to pro-
fessional positions. Two additional pieces of evidence lend support to the claim that professional
bureaucrats are hired on the basis of their merits and suitability for these higher-level positions.35
First, professional recruits become increasingly well qualified: the share of new hires who
hold bachelor’s degrees increases nearly every year from about 8 percent in 1975 to 60 percent in
2012 (see Appendix Figure F.1). Restricting this analysis to the two hiring periods in question,
35 percent of people recruited to jobs coded as professional hired by the NPP government (2004–
2008) held either a bachelor’s or master’s degree, compared to 55 percent for NDC government
hires (2008–2012). This suggests that as access to tertiary education expanded in Ghana, the
government recruited increasingly well-qualified applicants.
Second, recruitment through competitive procedures also became increasingly common.
A separate survey that I conducted with 864 local bureaucrats in professional positions revealed
that the vast majority were selected through competitive processes (Brierley, 2018).36 Restricting
the analysis to the two hiring periods, 33 percent of bureaucrats hired by the NPP government
took a competitive exam, while 92 percent had an interview. This compares to 67 percent who
took a competitive exam and 96 percent who had an interview under the NDC government.37
Overall, while the results do not point conclusively to meritocracy, they suggest that when the
NDC government came to office after the 2008 election, it used increasingly meritocratic hiring
criteria to select highly-educated individuals through increasingly competitive procedures.
35The ideal way to investigate meritocracy is to collect individual-level data on the pool of applicants, as well as
data on who is eventually hired. I was not able to obtain data on the pool of applicants across this period of time. To
my knowledge, there are no studies of African bureaucracies that perform such an analysis. An important exception
in the context of Latin America is Dal Bó, Finan and Rossi (2013), who do obtain data on the applicant pool.
36These bureaucrats worked in a random sample of 80 local governments across the country. This survey took place
in 2015 and 2016.
37I acknowledge that the conduct of interviews and exams does not ensure meritocracy. I do not have data on
how candidates performed in these assessments. Furthermore, candidates’ performance, especially in interviews, is
somewhat subjective. However, the fact that the NDC government hired more candidates following interviews and
exams suggests two things. First, it suggests a move towards meritocracy. Second, the delegation of hiring processes
from politicians to bureaucrats: bureaucrats conduct these processes and evaluate candidates.
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5.2 Regression analyses
A series of regression analyses adds further credibility to the results presented above (Table 2). In
these models, the dependent variables are dummy variables that indicate bureaucrats’ partisan type.
Column 1 predicts pro-NDC bureaucrats, Column 2 predicts swing bureaucrats, and 3 predicts
pro-NPP bureaucrats. The two main explanatory variables are a dummy variable that distinguishes
between the two hiring periods – the change in ruling party – and an indicator of whether the
job is menial. A positive coefficient on the interaction term would indicate that the new ruling
party distributed more menial than professional posts to their co-partisans. In these models, I hold
constant gender, age, and highest level of education.38
In Column 1, the coefficient on the variable that indicates a change in the ruling party is
negative. This suggests that a change in the ruling party is associated with an overall decrease in
the likelihood of a pro-NDC bureaucrat being hired to a professional position. The next coefficient
indicates the relationship between menial jobs and being a pro-NDC bureaucrat; it is also negative.
The coefficient on the interaction term is the key quantity of interest. The positive sign on this term
shows that the change in government is associated with an increase in the likelihood of a pro-NDC
bureaucrat being hired for a menial position. This coefficient is statistically significant below the
1 percent level. Figure 2 illustrates the substantive significance of this result.
Column 2 displays the results of the same model specification with Swing bureaucrats as
the dependent variable. None of the coefficients are statistically significant, which suggests that
the change in the ruling party did not affect hiring patterns for politically non-aligned bureaucrats.
Finally, Column 3 displays the results of the same model specification with Pro-NPP bu-
reaucrats as the dependent variable. The first coefficient is positive, although not statistically sig-
nificant. This suggests that the NDC government did not demonstrate partisan bias when recruiting
professionals; they continued to hire pro-NPP bureaucrats into these positions. However, there is
38Many bureaucrats did not indicate their highest level of education. In the Appendix, I present the same results
controlling only for gender and age, and the results remain the same. In Table J.1 the number of observations increases
by roughly 8,000 bureaucrats.
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Table 2: Logistic regression predicting hiring of partisan bureaucrats across each time period
Dependent variable:
NDC bureaucrat Swing bureaucrat NPP bureaucrat
(1) (2) (3)
Change in ruling party −0.154∗∗∗ 0.119 0.083
(0.059) (0.092) (0.056)
Menial −0.129 0.202 0.010
(0.094) (0.135) (0.084)
Change in ruling party * menial 0.614∗∗∗ −0.187 −0.434∗∗∗
(0.103) (0.150) (0.094)
Observations 9,780 9,068 9,780
Log Likelihood −6,111.116 −3,284.289 −6,725.204
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Notes: The regressions control for gender, age at time of hiring, and highest level of education.
Bureaucrats’ partisanship is coded according to their ethnicity. The change in the ruling party follows
Ghana’s December 2008 election, which resulted in the NDC coming to office. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05;
∗∗∗p<0.01.
a negative and statistically significant coefficient on the interaction term, which suggests that NPP
bureaucrats were less likely to be hired for menial positions.
Figure 2 displays the substantive significance of the results. I calculate the predicted proba-
bilities of a pro-NDC bureaucrat being hired to (a) a professional position and (b) a menial position
in the two time periods. Figure 2 shows the difference in these predicted probabilities and the as-
sociated 95 percent confidence intervals.
The top plot in Figure 2 demonstrates that the change in government is not associated with
a change in the likelihood of pro-NDC workers being hired for professional positions. In other
words, there is no evidence of discriminatory partisan hiring for professional jobs. In contrast, pro-
NDC bureaucrats were 10 percentage points more likely to be hired for menial positions after the
NDC came to power at the end of 2008. These results support the first hypothesis and demonstrate
that the regression results are substantively important.
The bottom plot in Figure 2 suggests that when the NDC was in power, it was less likely
to hire pro-NPP bureaucrats to menial positions. The change in predicted probabilities is about
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Figure 2: Difference in the predicted probability of a pro-NDC and pro-NPP bureaucrat being
hired in each term, disaggregated by job type.
(Pro−NDC)
Difference in predicted probabilities
Menial
Professional
−0.15 −0.10 −0.05 0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15
(Pro−NPP)
Difference in predicted probabilities
Menial
Professional
−0.15 −0.10 −0.05 0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15
Notes: Figure 2 displays the difference in the predicted probabilities of a pro-NDC/pro-NPP
bureaucrat being hired over the two time periods (2005–2008 and 2009–2012). I disaggregate job
types into professional and menial positions. I calculate these predicted probabilities using the
coefficients in Columns (1) and (2) of Table 2.
8 percentage points. The NDC government was neither more nor less likely to hire pro-NPP
bureaucrats for professional positions. In summary, the results suggest that the partisanship of
bureaucrats did not influence who got hired for professional positions, but did influence selection
into menial positions.
An alternative argument to the one that I present is that, besides the change in ruling party,
something else occurred that affected hiring patterns. Experts on Ghanaian politics, for example,
might point to the creation of 32 new districts, and corresponding local governments, in February
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2008 (10 months before the election).39 If these new districts were concentrated in areas where the
NDC were electorally dominant, one could argue that the new ruling party were disproportionately
hiring Pro-NDC bureaucrats into menial positions to staff these new local offices. However, this
argument is an unlikely explanation of the results because the new districts were not concentrated in
regions that I code as being Pro-NDC. Indeed, only ten of the new local governments (28 percent)
were in the three northern regions or in Volta region.
A similar change occurred in 2012, when the NDC government created another 46 districts.
In this case, a larger share of the new local governments were in the regions that I code as being
Pro-NDC (44 percent). As a robustness check, I re-run the analysis dropping all hires made after
28th June 2012 (the date the new districts were created). The results are robust to this specification
(see Appendix Table J.3).
Another rival argument is that the patterns I find result from an under supply of available
educated citizens from ethnic groups that are aligned with the NDC government. This would imply
that the NDC government had no choice but to hire educated citizens from either non-aligned ethnic
groups or from groups aligned to the NPP. Appendix Table G.1 displays evidence that there was a
roughly equal available supply of highly educated citizens aligned with either party. Specifically, I
estimate that there were a total of approximately 247,470 NDC-aligned citizens with higher levels
of education compared to 271,700 NPP-aligned citizens. The NDC government recruited a total of
5,940 professionals into the local bureaucrats during their first term in office after the 2008 election
(see Appendix Table C.1). Thus, the data suggest that had the NDC wanted to hire co-partisans to
these positions there was a large enough supply of competent individuals.40
39The total number of districts went from 138 to 170 (see Ayee, 2013).
40A final rival argument is that the patterns that I find are the result of changes in the supply of recruits, rather than
a change in demand for certain types of workers. However, given the immense value of having a public sector job, and
the fact that individuals do not have to pay to apply, I do not expect that pro-NPP recruits would stop applying after
the change in government.
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5.3 Evidence that menial positions are given to party intermediaries
The above results suggest that the new NDC government recruited co-partisans into menial po-
sitions after they came to office in 2008. In this section, I present quantitative and qualitative
evidence that politicians in Ghana reward party brokers with menial positions in the public sector,
including in local governments.
5.3.1 What motivates party intermediaries to work for the party machine?
Citizens in Ghana believe that brokers work for parties in return for material benefits. A country-
specific question in the 2012 Afrobarometer asked citizens why they thought party intermediaries
work for parties. Roughly 60 percent of Ghanaians responded that they do so because “they ex-
pect material rewards after winning political power" (Ghana Center for Democratic Development,
2017).41 The brokers themselves admit that they work for parties because of the selective incen-
tives they offer, including jobs (Bob-Milliar, 2012). Bob-Milliar (2012) explains, “Throughout the
Fourth Republic, party foot-soldiers have demanded openly to be rewarded by their respective par-
ties for their activism" (677). Pertinent to this article is whether menial jobs in local governments
are rewarded to party intermediaries.
I subset the data to analyze the share of pro-NDC hires to various menial positions between
2008 and 2012. Positions that had large shares of co-partisans include environmental assistants (65
percent of all hires), watch guards (55 percent) and disaster management officers (39 percent).42
These findings are consistent with accounts from Ghanaian scholars and journalists who have also
noted, for example, that local disaster management jobs are often distributed to party intermedi-
aries. One reporter explains that disaster management “has been known to be a den for political
appointees with governments recruiting its supporters to the organization even though they have
little or no experience in disaster management" (My Joy Online, 2017). In summary, the results
41In comparison, about one-third (31 percent), believe brokers toil for their party because “they believe in their
programs."
42See Appendix Table M.1.
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are consistent with scholarly and journalistic accounts, as well as with public opinion, that parties
in Ghana reward intermediaries with low-ranked public sector jobs.
5.3.2 What types of districts get menial hires?
The literature on patronage suggests that parties distribute public sector jobs to loyal supporters
as rewards for their work in getting out the votes (Robinson and Verdier, 2013). If politicians do
distribute jobs as rewards we might expect to see more menial hires in districts where the party
experienced significant increases in their vote share compared to the prior election. Such a result
would indicate that the incumbent party is strategic in their distribution of appointments; rewarding
brokers who brought them votes.
The results support this interpretation of menial jobs being distributed as rewards. Table
3 displays a positive correlation between the number of menial hires and district-level changes in
the vote share of the NDC. The data are aggregated at the district level, such that the dependent
variable is the number of menial hires per district. The data are restricted to the four-year electoral
term after the NDC came to power following the December 2008 election in order to analyze hires
made by the NDC government.43 The main independent variable is the change in the vote share of
the incumbent party between the 2004 and 2008 elections.
The first three columns in Table 3 consider all menial hires. The last three columns consider
menial hires who belong to ethnic groups aligned with the ruling party. All regressions include
region fixed effects. Column (1) shows a positive and statistically significant association between
change in the ruling party vote share and the number of menial hires. Column (4) also shows
a positive association between change in ruling party vote share and the number of Pro-NDC
hires, although this coefficient is not statistically significant.44 Columns (2) and (4) control for
both the type of local government and the population of the district.45 Including these variables
43There is significant variation in the number of menial hires per district, ranging from 1 to 613 recruits, with a
mean of 29 and a median of 22 per district.
44The p-value on this coefficient is 0.17.
45Local governments in Ghana are categorized as District, Municipal or Metropolitan Assemblies based on the
population of the district.
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significantly improves the fit of the model, and these variables are highly predictive: Municipal and
Metropolitan districts have more hires.46 In columns (5) and (6) the coefficient on change in NDC
votes share also becomes statistically significant (at the 0.1 level). Columns (3) and (6) also include
the share of houses with electricity, which serves as a proxy for urbanization. Again, the coefficient
of interest remains significant and positive. Substantively, the results suggest that a district where
the party saw a 10 percentage point increase in vote share would get 5 more menial hires than a
district that saw a 10 percentage point decrease in ruling party vote share (see Appendix Figure
Q.1 for a plot of the marginal effect of vote share). Overall, this analysis points to the strategic
allocation of menial hires to reward party intermediaries who rallied support for the new incumbent
party.47
5.3.3 Is there evidence that menial recruits are embedded in the communities they are hired
to work in?
Finally, I focus on one characteristic of party brokers that is essential for them to perform their
roles – their embeddedness in the community. I use the distance each officer works from her
hometown as a proxy for entrenchment. I assess whether bureaucrats in menial positions work in
local governments closer to their home towns than bureaucrats in professional positions. To clarify,
each district has one set of local government offices where all bureaucrats work. These offices
are located in the district capitals. Thus, workplace locations are constant across both groups of
bureaucrats. Working close to one’s hometown is not sufficient evidence that a bureaucrat in a
menial position is a broker. However, it is likely to be a necessary condition, and thus evidence of
a difference in the distances to hometowns for professional and menial bureaucrats lends further
credibility to my argument.
I use the hometown variable in the dataset to identify the town that bureaucrats view as their
“home", which typically refers to the place where they have familial roots. I geocode the locations
46The negative coefficient on the population coefficient is most likely because the type of local government already
accounts for the variation in population across districts.
47Appendix Table P.1 presents the same analyses with Pro-NPP hires as the dependent variable. These results show
that there is no relationship between the change in NDC vote share and the number of Pro-NPP hires.
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Table 3: Predictors of the number of menial hires (2009–2012)
Dependent variable
Number of menial hires
Total hires Pro-NDC hires
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆ in NDC vote share 36.146∗∗ 24.995∗∗ 22.492∗∗ 18.471 10.453∗ 12.215∗
(16.660) (10.595) (10.807) (13.391) (6.080) (6.180)
Metropolitan 168.005∗∗∗ 165.177∗∗∗ 161.024∗∗∗ 163.029∗∗∗
(12.578) (12.805) (7.136) (7.246)
Municipal 16.318∗∗∗ 15.576∗∗∗ 8.473∗∗∗ 8.978∗∗∗
(2.359) (2.444) (1.345) (1.386)
log(Population) −3.328 −4.164∗ −1.526 −0.901
(2.038) (2.163) (1.169) (1.244)
Electricity share 8.799 −6.326
(7.688) (4.417)
Region fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 157 157 157 152 152 152
R2 0.151 0.667 0.670 0.254 0.851 0.853
Adjusted R2 0.093 0.637 0.638 0.201 0.837 0.838
Notes: The unit of analysis is the district. Change in NDC vote share is measured between the 2004 and
2008 elections using constituency-level data from the parliamentary elections. The control variables
(population and electricity share) are from Ghana’s 2010 Housing and Population Census. ∗p<0.1;
∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
of district capitals and home towns and calculate the distance between the two for each bureaucrat
in the data.48 The results show that the median distance between home town and work location
is significantly lower for bureaucrats in menial compared to professional positions.49 The median
distance from their hometown is 36 km for menial and 92 km for professional jobs.50 Appendix
Figure O.1 focuses on a few select positions to further demonstrate these differences. The results
show that budget officers, planning officers and assistant directors work, on average, much far-
ther from their home communities than drivers, laborers and disaster management assistants. The
median distance from hometown is 19 km for laborers, 21 km for drivers, and 28 km for disaster
48I geo-code locations using search requests to the Google Maps API using the ggmap package in R. Google Maps
does not include every town in Ghana. I obtain complete matches (i.e., both hometown and district capital) for 74
percent of the bureaucrats hired in the study period (N=13,283 bureaucrats).
49See Appendix Figure N.1.
50Given the skewed distribution, the median is the most appropriate measure of average trends.
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assistants, compared to 151 km for budget officers, 161 km for planning officers and 174 km for
assistant directors.
These results lend further credence to my theory in two ways. First, they show that bureau-
crats working in professional positions are unlikely to be party brokers, suggesting instead that
they are hired based on non-partisan criteria. Second, and conversely, the results provide evidence
that bureaucrats in menial positions could work as party intermediaries. Working close to one’s
hometown allows partisan recruits to mobilize support for the incumbent by utilizing their social
ties with local communities and local party elites. Brokers employed in the district government
may be particularly effective intermediaries, as they can help citizens access the state, and can
distribute state resources to local voting blocs (Auerbach and Thachil, Forthcoming).
6 Conclusion
The improvement of bureaucratic competence is essential to enhancing state capacity in developing
democracies. Accordingly, who the state hires into the public sector has broad implications for
development. Many governments spend the bulk of public expenditure on public sector salaries.
This article assesses meritocratic versus patronage hiring in the context of Ghana. I theorize that
the costs to politicians of competitive hiring are not constant across positions. Conceptualizing
meritocracy as a continuous variable, I do not ask whether jobs are distributed on the basis of merit,
but which jobs are awarded competitively. I theorize that politicians in clientelistic democracies
will be more willing to relinquish control over hiring for professional jobs than they will be for
low-ranked positions in the public sector. Politicians reward party brokers who mobilize on their
behalf with these menial jobs.
I analyze an original individual-level dataset on the universe of bureaucrats working across
about 200 local governments in Ghana. As party affiliation is not a variable in the dataset, I
code bureaucrats’ partisanship based on their ethnicity and home region. I use a change in the
ruling party following Ghana’s 2008 elections to compare patterns of hiring under two opposing
parties. The results suggest that politicians are more likely to interfere in hiring for menial jobs
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than professional jobs: there is a 10-percentage-point increase in the probability of a co-partisan
being hired to a menial position after the change in government.
My theory highlights the problems of using legislation to measure meritocracy (Geddes,
1994; Ting et al., 2013). Merit legislation has been shown to be neither necessary nor suffi-
cient to ensure non-partisan hiring recruitment (Schuster, 2017). Indeed, weak rule-of-law and
legal loopholes mean that politicians regularly make partisan appointments in spite of merit laws
(Meyer-Sahling, 2006). The results suggest the need for continuous measures of patronage and
meritocracy. As an alternative to a legislative analysis, I propose measuring levels of patronage
using administrative data on the composition of public workforces.
The findings also shed light on the mixed results in the literature on the effect of competition
on patronage hiring. Driscoll (2017) finds that electorally competitive districts have more local
government employees in Ghana. He similarly argues that politicians exchange these – mainly low-
ranked – positions with party activists. Pierskalla and Sacks (2019) shows that the introduction of
elections increased the number of teachers employed in Indonesia. In contrast, much of the seminal
literature on the state suggests that electoral competition can constrain runaway state building and
incentivize politicians to support meritocracy (O’Dwyer, 2006; Geddes, 1994). My results suggest
that electoral competition can have both of these effects.
This study has significant implications for future research on the public sector. As new
data become available, it would be fruitful to replicate the analysis in other contexts. Similar
bureaucrat-level data can be used to assess meritocracy in other countries, and across different
public sector departments. Importantly, my results suggest the need to distinguish between differ-
ent types of jobs in such analyses in order to assess more nuanced hypotheses regarding the effects
of democracy on meritocratic versus patronage hiring practices.
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